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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
LLOYD E. LISH, J R . , : 
Plaintiff/Respondent. : 
- v s - : Case No. 14111 
DEAN COMPTON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Respondent, Lloyd E. Lish, J r . , respectfully petitions 
the Court for a rehearing of this matter based upon the following grounds: 
I - The Court erred in ruling that the Appellant Dean Compton 
was not a "merchant11 within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
II - The Court erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury 
that the confirmation was mailed by Respondent Lloyd E. Lish, J r . to 
Appellant within a "reasonable time'1 within the meaning of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
;.'0"':'--WHEREFORE, Respaident requests that the Court grant a 
rehearing in this matter and enter a decision affirming the verdict of the 
jury and the Judgment of the tr ial court. 
Dated this 29th day of March, 1976. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
Anthony Eyre \ l \ i ' 
A^orney for PlaintiWARespo\|ent 
520 Boston Building \ | * 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Respondent Lloyd E. Lish, 
J r . against the Defendant/Appellant Dean Compton for damages which he [ 
sustained as the result of a contract for the sale of wheat which was I 
breached by Defendant/Appellant. I 
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the | 
lower court. i 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE I 
The tr ial of the case was held in the District Court of Box 
Elder County on the 13th and 14th days of February, 1975 before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen with a jury. The case was submitted to 
the jury on Special Verdict and on February 14, 1975 they returned the 
Verdict answering the Interrogatories in favor of the Plaintiff and against 
the Defendant. 
i 
The Defendant made an oral Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict which was denied and Judgment was entered in favor of the 
Plaintiff on April 28, 1975. 
This Court reversed the verdict of the jury and the Judgment 
I 
of the tr ial court in a decision filed March 11, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the matter reheard by the Court 
- 3 -
and for a decision affirming the verdict of the jury and the Judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action a r i ses out of a contract which Plaintiff Lloyd E. 
Lish, J r . entered into with the Defendant Dean Compton on August 2, 1973 
whereby Defendant agreed to sell and Plaintiff agreed to buy 15, 000 bushels 
of red wheat n as i s " at $3. 30 per bushel. Defendant denied that the contrac 
was entered into and, additionally, asserted the Statute of Frauds as a 
defense. (R. 204, Jury Instruction #4) 
On or about August 3, 1973 the Plaintiff prepared a written 
confirmation of the contract which contained the following: ! ,red wheat, rye 
mix. . . 15 , 000 bushels, $3. 30 per bushel, as is .1 1 (R. 19, Exhibit #2) 
This confirmation was mailed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant on or about 
August 14, 1973 and was received by the Defendant in the mails in the after-
noon of August 15, 1973. (R. 27, Exhibit #3) 
From the 2nd through the 14th days of August, 1973 the price 
of #1 red wheat on the Ogden grain market increased from $3.63 per bushel 
to $4. 37 per bushel. (R. 35-40, Exhibit #4) This increase was unpreci-
dented and both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, as well as Mr. Rudolph 
Globoker, an employee of Pillsbury Mills Company, Ogden, Utah, testified 
that such a sharp fluctuation in this short a period of time was highly 
unusual and nothing comparable to this had occurred in pr ior years . (R. 41 
- 4 - "'. 
•91, 150) ...'; 
The Defendant is the owner of farms in Cassia County, Idaho 
and Box Elder County, Utah. His occupation for the past 20 to 25 years 
has been in raising and selling farm commodities, principally wheat, 
which he produces in substantial quantities. The commodities which he 
ra i ses a re produced primarily for resale and he has been engaged in the 
selling of wheat for the 20 to 25 year period. He sells wheat both to 
merchandisers such as Mr. Lish and also directly to storage and processing 
companies which a re located in Ogden, Utah. He also keeps himself apprised 
of the fluctuation of the price of wheat and other grains and personally 
handles all of his business transactions. (R. 100-103) 
The grains which the Defendant produces a re stored by him 
in facilities which he owns and are then sold at varying t imes, depending 
upon the market conditions. In this regard, the part ies had entered into 
and performed three other contracts for the sale of wheat during the same 
year as the contract in question. The Defendant is a knowledgeable business-
man and farmer and according to his testimony, he has "merchandised" 
grain by entering into a "future contract11 for grain not yet produced. (R. 100-
103) 
The jury was instructed as to the contentions of each of the 
part ies and as to the applicable law and the case was submitted to them on 
a Special Verdict. (R. 204-211) A unanimous Special Verdict was returned 
' - 5 - • ' • ' 
by the jury which found that a contract was entered into between Plaintiff 
and Defendant for the sale of the wheat, that the Defendant was a 
"merchant" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, and that 
a written confirmation was received by him from the Plaintiff within a 
reasonable time after the contract. (R. 212) 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDAN T WAS NOT A 
,!MERCHANTIWITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE. 
The jury has found that a contract was entered into for the 
sale of the wheat by Defendant to the Plaintiff in excess of the sum of 
$500. 00. Plaintiff concedes that under the Statute of Frauds provision of 
the Uniform Commercial Code for such a contract to be enforceable, it 
normally must be signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. 
However, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code have provided 
certain instances when a party may be bound by an oral contract, even 
though he has not signed a writing evidencing the same and Section 70A-2-20 
provides in part as follows: 
"Formal requirements - Statute of Frauds . -
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section a contract for the sale of goods for 
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable 
by way of action or defense unless there is 
some writing sufficient to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the 
part ies and signed by the party against whom 
- 6 -
enforcement is sought or by Hs authorized 
agent or broker. 
r,(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable 
time a writing in confirmation of the contract 
and sufficient against the sender is received 
and the party receiving it has reason to know 
its contents, it satisfies the requirements of 
subsection (1) against such p;?rty unless written 
notice of objection to its contents is given v/ithm 
ten days after it is received. " [Emphasis added] 
• Regardless of what may have constituted a inerchaiu at 
common law or what interpretation was given this term by *-he general 
public, it has been given a specific meanin-/ c- *-h^  drafvr^ -" :-.e • -Ifova 
Commercial Code because of its cruc'ul import and impaci* on the foregoing 
stati.'o .v*- : >c- • *! • *!(1'i-!« >- ^ •'<<» - -u -, -d 
herea f t e r . Lv M.-S r e g a r d . Section 70A -2-104 provide:; as follows: 
"(1) 'Merchant' m e a n s a pe r son who deals in 
goods of the kind or otherwise by h i s occupa-
tion holds himself out a s having knowledge or 
ski l l pecu l ia r to the p rac t i ce s or goods 
involved in the t ransac t ion or to whom such 
knowledge or ski l l may be at t r ibuted by h is 
employment of an agent or b roke r or other 
i n t e r m e d i a r y who by his occupation holds 
h imsel f out as having such knowledge or skill 
[Emphasis added] 
As can be seen by the foregoing, there a r e three a l te rna t ive bases upon 
whicl i a pe r son can be held to be a "merchant." 1 R. Anderson, Uniform 
Commerc i a l Code, j>. 220 (2d ed. lOVi) provide^; 
nA merchan t i s defined ir. ter -ns of three 
concepts ; 
7-
n(a) Dealer. He may be a person who deals 
in goods of the kind involved. Whether he deals 
in other goods is immaterial . He must deal 
in goods of the kind involved in the transaction 
in order to come within this first category. 
u(b) Representation. He may be a person who 
by his occupation holds himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices of 
goods involved in the transaction. Whether he 
actually has such knowledge or skill is imma-
terial if he so holds himself out. 
"(c) Principal. . . . 
"The above categories are stated disinjunctively: 
a person is classified as a merchant if he satisfies 
any one of the categories. ! l [Emphasis added] 
There is no question in this case that the Defendant is a person 
who "deals in goods of the kind" in question here , i . e . wheat, and thus falls 
squarely with the first statutory definition. As was noted in the Statement 
of Fac ts , he has been engaged in the business of raising and selling wheat 
for approximately 20-25 years at farms of substantial acreage located in 
Cassia County, Idaho and Box Elder County, Utah which were produced 
principally for resa le . The wheat in question constitutes "goods" and 
Section 70A-2-105, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
"(1) TGoods! means all things (including specially 
manufactured goods) which are movable at the 
time of identification to the contract for sale 
other than the money in which the price is to be 
paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and 
things in action. !Goods1 also inc ludes . . . 
growing crops and other identified things 
attached to realty (section 70A-2-107)." 
[Emphasis added] 
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Likewise , the Defendant is a person who has "skil l pecu l ia r 
to the p r a c t i c e s or goods involved in the transact ion '1 uhich brin.;s lnm 
within the ambit of the second s ta tu tory definition. He conceded that he 
/! - • ._-s"? r v ''' . ; . r r a ; r i e*'" c!: '- j;! r ' i ' ' jerrJ ' \M:M \-> {• i''*j\n*'-: •-.•-•-*£ - p " X , 
as well a s d i rec t ly with gra in s to rage and p rocess ing companies in Ogden, . 
Ufcai i. He kept hiinself appr i sed of the fluctuating p r i ces of wheat and o?-her 
g ra in s and handled his bus ines s t r ansac t ions personal ly . 
•..'• The Defendant is a sophist icated agr icu l tu ra l commodity 
p roduce r and s e l l e r and to ca tegor ize him as a •;••;••: :. - ' - -> ;T 
i s a conclusion no^ war ran ted b> --he evidence P: *h:s r ega rd the Defendant 
concedes thac * ~s : — ^^j/i^cc '";i ' : c . * -r.^ing 
into futures cont rac ts for g ra in not yet pr^due^d and stated i^ oa r . as follows: 
"A - Yes . I 'm hesi ta t ing; I want to be su re I 
get the gist of the ques t ion . I've sold d i rec t ly 
to mi l l s and I have had m e r c h a n d i s e r s or 
' d e a l e r s hual it for me to those p laces for s to rage 
and put in my name , and then I have made the 
deal and the se t t l ement at a l a t e r da te . I have 
a l so merchand i sed where I have made a cont rac t 
ahead of t ime , a future cont rac t , before the grain 
i s produced or before it i s ha rves ted , and with 
gra in m e r c h a n d i s e r s . " (R, 101-102) [Emphasis 
added] 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the Defendant is a pe r son who -.as ' .a l l 
pecu l i a r 1 :* .' .• - ;<-'-*V ,>,
 L ^ , i *• •!. * - ,r-^ - • ,« . ..:. o roid 
o therwise would be to ignore the r eco rd or thv. case , 
i.: • -. di ' jL; ;on i"r:c.: Court has indie:'ted t:ha( it feels that TTthe 
meaning of the t e r m merchan t as used in the s ta tute under eons idera t i r 
- 9 -
refers pr imari ly to one whose occupation is that of buying and selling. , r It 
i s c lear from a reading of the definition of merchant" set forth in the Unifor 
Commercial Code that it does not require that a person buy as well as 
sell commodities in order to be deemed a merchant but that he f ,deals in 
goods of a kind" or has "skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved 
in the transaction, f I both of which a re descriptive of the Defendant. Like-
wise, the evidence in this case indicates that the raising of wheat and other 
grains for resale is not only the "substantial part of his occupation" as 
defined by this Court, but is virtually the only occupation which he engages 
in. 
The apprehension of the Court that any person may be held to 
be deemed afinerchanf!!with respect to any casual sale by him of property 
which he has produced or otherwise acquired appears unjustified and this 
was not the intent of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code who have 
res t r ic ted persons who are held to the standard of a* merchant to be those 
who deal in goods of the kind or have other special knowledge or skills 
concerning the same. The Official Code Comments to Section 70A-2-104 
provide as follows: 
" For purposes of these sections almost 
every person in business would, therefore, 
be deemed to be a 'merchant* under the language 
fwho.. .by his occupation holds himself out as 
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the p rac -
tices. . . involved in the t ransac t ion . . . ! since 
the practices involved in the transaction are 
non-specialized business practices such as 
answering mail . In this type of provision, banks 
-10-
or even un ive r s i t i e s , for example , well 
may be ' m e r c h a n t s . ! But even these 
sect ions only apply to a merchan t in h is 
m e r c a n t i l e capacity; a lawyer or bank 
pres iden t buying fishing tackle for his own 
.• ' , • use Is not a merchan t . v [Emphasis added] 
The Defendant i s m o r e than a casual s e l l e r and ad the r e c o r d 
d i s c l o s e s , the subs tant ia l quanti t ies of wheat which he produces a r« placed 
jn i-i-r^cre ^iic:1''ties owned by him and sold when m a r k e t conditions a r e 
favorable . In this r ega rd the Defendant had sold g ra ins to Plaintiff on 
As was noted by the Court in i ts opinion, this wa^ a t ransac t ion 
or ,;ome mag / l t ude , i „ e 1 5, 000 bi isl lels of wheat at $3 30 p- •• . - ._-.: d 
if the decis ion is allowed to s tand, it would effectively isola te the Defendant 
and o t h e r ' s i m i l a r l y si tuated p r o d u c e r s and s e l l e r s of l a r g e quanti t ies of -
ag r i cu l tu ra l products from the implied -warranty that the i r products would 
be merchantable as defined in the Uniform Commerc ia l Code. In this r e g a r d , 
"Implied w a r r a n t ^ - Merchantability •-
Usage of t r ade . - *1) Unless excluded or 
m o d i f i e d . . . , a w a r r a n t y that the goods 
shal l be merchan tab le is implied in a 
contract for their sa le if the s e l l e r Is a 
merchan t with r e spec t to goods of that kind. 
it 
(Fo r other provis ions of the Uniform Commerc i a l Code where the concept 
of,tnerchanf^' Ls significant, see 70A-2-1Q3OW 70A-2-327(!)(c), 70A-2-S03 
aiiu 70A-2-509. ) 
~ l l -
As was pointed out by Plaintiff in his Brief, the courts in the 
case of Campbell v. Yokel, 313 N.E.2d 628, 20 111. App. 3d 702 (1974) and 
Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203, 69 Ohio Ops. 2d 192, 
318 N.E.2d 428 (1973), have held that where a farmer markets the commodi-
ties produced by him on a regular basis , he is a person ?!who deals in goods 
of that kind11. The court in the Yokel case, supra, stated in part as follows: 
" We believe that farmers who regularly 
market their crops are professionals ' in 
that business and are 'merchants1 when they 
are selling those crops. n 
The only case found by the wri ter giving a contrary result is the case of 
Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fal l is , 395 S.W.2d 555, 239 Ark. 962 (1965). Howeve 
in that case there was no evidence offered at the tr ial that the farmer was a 
dealer in "goods of the kind" and, thus, he was held not to be a "merchant". 
This contrasts markedly to the record in this case which amply demonstrate 
the dealing of the Defendant in "goods of the kind" as well as his knowledge 
and expertise in this type of transaction. 
As the record amply demonstrates in this case, the Defendant 
is a knowledgeable farmer-businessman who has produced and marketed 
wheat which constitutes the "goods of the kind" in question for some 20-25 
years on a substantial basis and has a great deal of skill and knowledge with 
respect to the same. To hold that he is not a "merchant" within the meaning 
of the Uniform Commercial Code is contrary to the l i teral wording and 
purpose of the statute as set forth above. 
-12-
Additionally, the jury found on conflicting evidence that the 
Defendant had entered into a contract for the sa le of the wheat in question 
to the Plaintiff which finding has not been se r ious ly at tacked by the Defendant 
or upset by this Court . In view of th i s , the purpose of the Statute of F r a u d s 
should be borne in mind which was se t forth by the Supreme Court of New 
J e r s e y in the case of Cohn v. F i s h e r , 287 A. 2d 222, 118 N . J . Super 286 
(1972) a s follows• 
" . . . T h e s tatute of frauds was not designed 
to pro tec t a par ty who made an o ra l cont rac t , 
but r a t h e r to aid a pa r ty who did not make a 
cont rac t , — M 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE VERDICT OF THE JURY 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD RECEIVED A WRITTEN CONFIRMATION 
OF THE CONTRACT FROM THE PLAINTIFF WITHIN A REASONABLE 
TIME11 WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
The definition of what is a reasonable t ime within the meaning 
of the Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code is se t forth in Section 7OA-1-204 which 
p rov ides in pa r t a s follows: 
"(2) What i s a reasonab le t ime for taking 
any action depends on the n a t u r e , purpose 
and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of such a c t i o n . . . . n 
In this ca se a Special In te r roga to ry was submit ted to the jury 
asking them to find whether or not the confirmation was rece ived within a 
" reasonab le t ime n and the i r unanimous answer to this question was MYes. ! f 
-13- . 
(Instruction #7, R. 207) 
The decision of this Court in holding that the delay of approxi-
mately twelve (12) days in mailing the confirmation was not reasonable as 
a matter of law, is not supported by the record or applicable law. The 
decision of this Court flies directly in the face of i ts decision in the case 
of Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121 (1974) where in referr 
to the same statute in question, stated as follows: 
"Unless it is otherwise stated or agreed upon 
by the par t ies , what is a 'reasonable time1 is 
a question of fact to be determined from the 
c i rcumstances ." 
The decision from this Court in the Valley Bank & Trust case , 
supra, to the effect that what is a "reasonable time" within the meaning of 
the statute in question is a question of fact to be decided by the jury i s 
uniformly supported by the authorities. In the case of Azevedo v. Minister, 
471 P . 2d 66 (Nev. 1970) the Court held that a delay of ten (10) weeks in 
sending a confirmation of the contract was not unreasonable as a mat ter of 
law and stated as follows: 
" . . .Appellant argues that the delay of 10 
weeks . . . a s a matter of law is an unreasonable 
time. We do not agree. What i s reasonable 
must be decided by the t r ier of facts under 
all the circumstances of the case under 
cons idera t ion . . . . , r 
It should be noted that what is a "reasonable t ime" appears 
to be a classic jury question and they had had an opportunity to see the 
witnesses, hear their testimony and review the other evidence surrounding 
-14-
the transaction and made their judgment that the time in question was 
reasonable based on an admittedly correct statement of the law. 
The concept of what is "reasonable timeM under the statute in 
question, appears analogous to cases involving whether a person driving an 
automobile has acted in a "reasonable11 manner which this Court has 
repeatedly held constitutes a question for determination by the jury. In 
this regard the Court in the case of Fairbourn v. Lloyd, 21 Utah 2d 62, 
440 P. 2d 257 (1968), stated in part as follows: 
, !
. . . The statute fs language self espouses 
the reasonable, prudent man doctrine, and 
in truth invites and demands that some 
arbitor of the facts determine whether speed, 
traffic and road conditions were such as 
to adjudge one as being reasonable or unreason-
able, 
Plaintiff likewise feels this Court has erred in that it has 
invaded the province of the jury concerning what constitutes a "reasonable 
t ime" within the meaning of the statute in question which is contrary to its 
long established practice. See Garrett Freight Lines v. Cornwall, 120 Utah 
175, 232 P. 2d 786; Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co. , 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 
P.2d 145 (1973); and Movie Fi lms, Inc. v. F i rs t Sec. Bank of Utah, N . A . , 
22 Utah 2d 1, 447 P. 2d 38 (1968). The Court appears to weigh the evidence 
and comments that there must be "some better reason than that given by 
the plaintiff, of mere casual delay, for his failure to give the notice for 12 
days ," and ponders as to what his position would have been "if the price 
had fallen a dollar a bushel, instead of rising that much. " These factors, 
-15- - ' 
as well as others, were all before the jury when the issue in question was 
submitted to them and they ruled in favor of the Plaintiff. Additional 
factors which were present included the highly unusual fluctuation in the 
market price which had never occurred previously, as well as the prior 
conduct of the part ies in delaying several days from the date of the oral 
contract until performance of the same. 
It should be noted that the statute allowed the Defendant ten 
(10) days to reject the confirmation and to hold that it was unreasonable as 
a mat ter of law for the Plaintiff to take approximately twelve (12) days to 
mail the confirmation is untenable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff asse r t s that the Court er red in holding that the 
Defendant was not a ''merchant1 * within the meaning of the Uniform Commerc 
Code where the evidence is uncontradicted that he dealt in "goods of the 
kind11 and had a great degree of "knowledge," "skill" and experience in 
connection with the same. 
Additionally, the question of whether or not the written memo-
randum confirming the contract was received by the Defendant from the 
Plaintiff within a "reasonable t ime" within the meaning of the Uniform 
Commercial Code was a classic question of fact to be submitted to the jury 
and the Court er red in setting aside its verdict in this regard. 
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Plaintiff requests that his Petition for Rehearing be granted 
and that a decision be entered affirming the verdict of the jury and the 
Judgment of the trial court. 
Dated this 31st day of March, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J, ANTHONY EYRE 
Kipp and Christian 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing and 
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing to Omer J. Call, Attorney 
for Defendant/Appellant, 26 F i r s t Security Bank Building, Brigham City, 
Utah 84302, this 31st day of March, 1976. 
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